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circumstance tending to show the subservience of the employee, since it is incompatible with the full control of the
work by another. In the Drillon case it was said that the
power to discharge is it significant factor in fixing the status
of employer; that the test is whether the right or authority
to discharge existed and not whether the employer could have
exercised it if the employee was physically out of reach. In
Billig v. Southern Pacific Co., supra, it was determined to
be the rule in this state that when a master hires out a servant
to operate an instrumentality, together with the use of the
instrumentality, he does not. necessarily cease to be the employer of the servant where he has not relinquished the power
to discharge him; that in such case the legal effect is that,
though the hirer directs the servant where to go and what to
do in the performance of the work, the servant remains in
the general employment of the master in so far as concerns
the manner and method of operating the instrumentality. It
is true that in the Billig case the rule was applied for the
purpose of placing the blame for regligence in the operation
of the instrumentality. The liberal interpretation enjoined
by the pr~visions of the Workmen's Compensation Act, however, reqUIres that the same rule should apply to determine
whether the original employer of the servant and the owner
of the instrumentality is an employer subject to the provisions
of the act. (Employers' Liability Assur. Corp. v. Industrial
Acc. Com., supra.)
[lb] Although in the present case there was a provision
in the lease that the lessee should employ the drivers of
equipment leased by it, in actual practice the lessor reserved
the right to hire and discharge the driver of this particular
truck. In its own interest the lessor exhibited a special concern for and exercised a general supervision over the method
of handling the truck, which apparently required special skill
in operation. It was kept at the yard of the lessor at night
and was dispatched from there in the morning. From the
conduct of the parties it is obvious that section 4 of the lease
was intended to allocate, as between the lessor and lessee responsibility under the Workmen's Compensation Act 'and
liability for negligence of the driver toward third perso~s un.
der the doctrine of respondeat superior.
[5] In determining the right to death benefits under the
act it is immaterial that the parties to the lease had entered
into an agreement that the one or the other should be solely
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liable. (See Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com., 8 Ca1.2d 589 [67 P.2d 105).) Such an agreement may not affect the claimants' rights under the. act to
proceed against either or both the general an? specIal employer. (American Motorists Ins. Co. v. Industr'Ud cc . Com.,
8 Ca1.2d 585 [67 P.2d 103]; Employers' Liab£l~tyAssur.
Corp. v. Industrial Acc. Com., supra; Famous Players etc.
Corp. v. Industrial Ace. Com., 194 C~l. 134 [228 P. 5, ?4
A.L.R. 765]; Diamond Drill Contrachng Co. v .. lndustr~al
Acc. Com., 199 Cal. 694 (260 P. 862].)
.
,.,
.
It follows that the commission did not exceed its powers m
determining that Miller Oil Products was t~fgEme~al employer of George Ivy at the time involved,. and' m.; ho~dlng the
petitioner liable for the payment of the. award to. hIS, dependents.
The award is affirmed.

4

Gibson, C. J., Curtis, J., Edmonds,
J., and Schauer, J., concurred.

d. , Carter, i,

Traynor"

Petitioners' application for a rehearing was denied December 20, 1943.

[L. A. No. 18641.
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Dec. 1, 1943.]

Estate of LUTHER BRISTOL, Deceased.. AGNES BRISTOL, Appellant, v. EDITH YOUNG, Respo,ndent..

Review.-Th~~es'

of evidence,
[1] Wills-Oontest-Evidence:
the weight to be accorded to the evidence,. and the province
of a reviewing court, are the same in a will contest as in any
other civil case.
of Law and Fact-Oonsideration of Evi,Appeal-Questions
[2]
dence-Resolving Oonflicts: Extent of Power of Oourt•.....,On
appeal, all conflicts in the evidence must be resolved in favor
of the respondent and all legitimate and reasonable inferences
indulged to uphold the verdict or findings,.if pos~ible. Where
the verdict or findings are attacked for msufficlency of the
evidence, the power of the appellate court begins and ends
McK. Dig. References: [1] Wills, §§ 504, 508, 554; [2] Apl?cal
and Error, §§ 1235,1243; [3] Appeal and Error, § 1243; [4] Wills,
§ 249; [5J Wills, § 459.
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wi~h a determination as to whether there is any substantial
eVIdence to support them.
[8] Id.-Questions of Law and Fact-Consideration of EvidenceResolvi~g Conflicts.-Inasmuch as it is common knowledge
among Judges and lawyers that many cases are determined to
the satisfaction of trial judges or juries by evidence which is
overwhelming in its persuasiveness, but which may appear
~elatlvcly unsubstantial in thc record, appellate courts should,
if .thcre be any r?asonable doubt as to the sufficiency of the
eVIdence to sustam a finding, resolve that doubt in favor of
the finding.
[4] Wills-Revocation-Destruction-Disappearance of Instrum?nt-Presumptions.-The presumption of revocation of a
wIll by destruction arising from the fact that it was last secn
and known to have been in the testator's possession but which
cann~t be fou.n~ after his death, may be rebutted
evidence
showmg that It IS equally probable that the will was destroyed
by a person other than the testator, or that the act was not
done with an intention to revoke the will.
[5] Id. - Probate - Lost or Destroyed Wills - Evidence - Sufficiency. - The evidence sustained a finding that a lost codicil
had .neve~ been cancelled or destroyed by the testator and
Nas m eXIstence at the time of his death, where it could reasonably be in~erred that the testator entrusted a large sum of
money to hIS daughter's husband because the codicil nominated
her as executrix in place of his wife, where there was testimony that, during his last illness, the wife had stated that
she would tear up the will if she ever got possession of it;
where she had knowledge of the codicil and of its contents'
where she had been informed by the testator that she would
get nothing out of his estate other than the real property which
he had deed.ed to her; and where it could be inferred that the
testator beheved the will was in existence and operative.

by

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of IJos
Angeles County admitting a will to probate. Myron Westover, JUdge. Affirmed.
Jacob Forst and W. P. Smith for Appellant.
Don Lake and Charles G. Young for Respondent.
. SCHADE.R, J.-The controlling question on this appeal
the. suffiCIency of the evidellce to support the finding of
the trIal court that' 'the deceased never cancelled or destroyed

IS

[4] See 26 Cal.Jur. 807.
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the codicil of April 28th, 1941, and said codicil ~M in existence at the time of his death." The contest is purely one
of presumptions and inferences. That the codicil was duly
executed is established without question but, after the testa..
tor's death it' WM never found. No witness was produced
who claim~d (or admitted) to have seen such lost codicil
after the day of its execution nor, on the other hand, to have
seen the testator destroy it or to have heard him declare
that it had been revoked. There is evidence which, on the cold
pages of the record, appeals' to reMon M supporting the
conclusion that the codicil was destroyed by the testator, but
a critical consideration of the entire record impels us to the
conviction that the circumstances depicted are not devoid of
substantially conflicting inferences. [1] The rules of evidence the weight to be accorded to the evidence, and the,
provi~ce of a reviewing court, are the same ina will contest
as in any other civil case. (Estate of SnowbalZ (1910), 157
Cal. 301, 305 [107 P. 598] ; Estate of Barr (1924), 69 Cal.
App. 16, 33 [230 P. 181].) [2] The rule as to our province is: "In reviewing the evidence ... all conflicts must be
resolved in favor of the respondent, and all legitimate and
reMonable inferences indulged in to uphold the verdict if
possible. It is an elementary ... principle of law, that when
a verdict is attacked as being unsupported, the power of the
appellate court begins and ends with a determination M to
whether there is any substantial evidence, contradicted or
uncontradicted, which will support the conclusion reached
by the jury. When two or more inferences can be reMonably
deduced from the facts, the reviewing ~ourt is without power
to substitute its deductions for those of the trial court."
(Italics added.) (Crawford v. Southern Pacific Co. (1935),
3 CaL2d 427, 429 [45 P.2d 1831.) The rule quoted is as
applicable in reviewing the findings of a judge as it is when
considering a jury's verdict. The critical word in the definition is " substantial" j it is a door which can lead as readily
to abuse as to practical or enlightened justice. [3] It, is
COlnmon knowledge among judges and lawyers that many
cases are determined to the entire satisfaction of trial judges
or juries, on their factual issues, by evidence which is overwhelming in its persuasiveness but which may appear rela-,
tively unsubstantial-if it can be reflected at all-in a phonographic record. Appellate courts, therefore, if there be any
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reasonable doubt as to the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a finding, should resolve that doubt in favor of the
finding; and in searching the record and exploring the inferences which may arise from what is found there, to discover whether such doubt or conflict exists, the court should
be realistic and practical. Upon such view of the law we
cannot hold that any essential finding in this case is unsupported.
Appellant-contestant relies upon the rule stated in section
350 of the Probate Code that "No will shall be proven as a
lost or destroyed will unless proved to have been in existence
at the time of the death of the testator, or shown to have been
destroyed fraudulently or by public calamity in the lifetime
of the testator, without his knowledge," and upon the presumption which has been declared by this court (Estate of
Sweetman (1921), 185 Cal. 27, 28 [195 P. 918]; Estate of
Johnston (1922), 188 .Ca1. 336, 340 [206 P. 628)), and
which is well stated in 26 California Jurisprudence 807, section 141, that "Where the evidence shows that the instrument cannot be found, and that when last seen or known to
exist it was in the custody or possession of the decedent, the
conclusion of law is that the writing was destroyed by the
decedent, and that he acted with the intention of effecting
a revocation thereof." Presenting the other side of the controversy, respondent calls attention to the legal proposition
that the burden of proof was on appellant-contestant and
urges that the circumstances shown are sufficient to at least
balance, and therefore to overcome, the presumption invoked
by appellant, through raising inferences that the decedent
never destroyed or revoked the codicil, that he believed at
the time of his last illness that it was still in existence, and
that in fact it was in existence at the time of his demise.
[4] It should be noted that the above-quoted presumption
which is relied upon by appellant-contestant is qualified by
the further statement in 26 California JurisprUdence at page
807, in section 141, that "Nothing else appearing, the admission of the writing to probate as a lost or destroyed will
must be denied. However, the proponent may secure the
admission of the instrument by presenting evidence which
rebuts the conclusion or presumption that arises from the
facts of possession by the decedent and loss or disappearance.
. .. It follows that the proponent is entitled to a favorable
decree whlll"e he presents evidence showing that it is equally
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probable (1) that the will was destroyed by another person
than the decedent, or (2) that the act was not done with an
intention to revoke the instrument." (Italics added.)
The mooted codicil was referred to by the parties throughout the trial as the "lost codicil" and will be so designated
in this opinion. Viewing the evidence in aspects most favorable to sustaining the attacked finding (Von Breton v. Hick$
(1942), 55 Cal.App.2d 909, 912 [131 P.2d 560)), the facts
appear as hereinafter narrated.
Luther Bristol successfully raised a family of five children, including four sons and one daughter, Edith Bristol
Young, the respondent-proponent herein, and accumulated a
modest fortune. Late in life, apparently having lost his first
wife, the mother of his children, he took to wife Agnes Bristol, many years his junior. This latter marriage did not·
produce an altogether harmonious union. It was punctuated
by a separate maintenance action filed by Agnes, by Ii. crosscomplaint for divorce filed by Luther, by an amended com·
plaint on the part of Agnes also seeking a divorce, and bya
rescission suit instituted· by Luther in which he sought to
recover from Agnes certain income-producing real property
which he had deeded to her. The divorce litigation ended
in an impasse in which neither party was granted a decree
and the rescission action was dismissed in reliance upon a
false representation by Agnes which will shortly be referred
to again. The principal result of the controversy being litigated is the determination of whether Agnes, the widow, or
Edith, the daughter, shall administel," the affairs of the estate,
and whether a crippled granddaughter, Rita, who appears to
have been definitely in Luther's affections, shall inherit· a
share of the estate.
.
Luther died on September 30, 1942, at an age of more
than ninety-three years. Three testamentary documents are
involved in the proceedings: (1) a '''Last Will and Testament of Luther Bristol," dated April I, 1938, executed when
the testator was approximately ninety years of age (and apparently shortly after the marriage to Agnes, the exact date
of which does not appear); (2) a "Codicil to My Will· Dated
April I, 1938," itself bearing the date of July 28, 1939; and
(3) the lost codicil, dated April 28, 1941. Another instrument, admittedly lacking testamentary competence, was found
typed on the first codicil. It was prepared and typed by a
as

O.2d-a
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appears that deeds conveying the real property to the chilo
dren in general accord with the testamentary plan were also
prepared and signed but were not delivered during the testator's lifetime. Such deeds, together with the original will
and first codicil (and the abortive attempt at a cod~cil typed
on the first codicil by the notary public) were found in the
testator's safety deposit box after his demise. The lost codicil, so far as appears, was never placed in the safety deposit
box. It was last seen, so far as claimed or admitted by any
witness, at the time the testator placed it in his pocket after
its execution.
The evidence tends to show that Mr. Bristol, after executing
the lost codicil, never changed his mind as to providing for
Rita, the returned granddaughter, or as to revoking the devise of the income property which had been deeded to Agnes,
or as to appointing the daughter, Edith Bristol Young, as
executrix. Mr. Bristol apparently was of sound and disposing mind up to within a few hours of his death.
[5] Until a few days before his passing, Mr. Bristol kept
on his body a money belt in which he had deposited $5,950.
This money at that time, in his presence, by his direction,
and in the presence of others of the family, was handed to
Mr. Charles G. Young, the husband of Edith, and a member
of the bar, for safekeeping. While nO oral statement was
made specifying in words that this money was entrusted to
Mr. Young because his wife (Mr. Bristol's daughter) Edith
was, by the terms of the lost codicil, to be the executrix of
Mr. Bristol '8 will, the reticence of those participating in thE!
conversation to speak bluntly concerning such matters at that
time is easily understandable and the inference which the
trial judge drew from the circumstances, to the effect that
such was the object, the intent, and. the understanding of the
parties, is a reasonable one.
It is noteworthy that the petition for probate of the lost
codicil expressly charges that such lost codicil "has never
been revoked and was in exisience at the time of the testator's death, but was destroyed and petitioner alleges on information and belief that said codicil was destroyed by Agnes
Bristol, the surviving wife of the deceased." (Italics added.)
Nowhere in the record does it appear that Agnes as a witness expressly or specifically or directly denied this charge.
There is testimony that at a time eight days before Mr. Bris·

~otary publi~ who thus futilely assumed to engage unlawfully
1~ the prac~ICe of law, but aside from some possible eviden-
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tiary value III the proof of intent-which the trial court found
nonpersuasive-it has no significance here.
There is no contest as to the will of April 1 1938 nor as
to the codicil of July 28, 1939. The issue is' joined solely
~s .to the codicil of April 28, 1941-the "lost codicil." And
It IS not as to the. fact ~f its original due execution but only
as to the fact of ItS eXIstence at the time of Luther's death
that there is conflict. By the original will of April 1 1938
A~nes, the newly acquired wife, was nominated ex;cutri~
WIthout b?nd, she wa.s devised certain income-producing real
pro~erty I~proved WIth ~ four-unit flat building and a single
famIl:v reSIdence, and, WIth the testator's children, was made
a reSIduary legatee. The codicil of JUly 28 1939 revised
the original will (of April 1, 1938) only as t~ prov'ision for
the t~stator 's son Walter and his granddaughters Ruth and
Be:ll1ce Olsen: It d~es not affect the interests of either Agnes
~~Istol or EdIth BrIstol Young and has no significance in the
htlgated controversy except as it may tend to depict the scrup~lous car~ and concern which the testator manifested for
hIs own chIldren and their children.
Th~ lost codicil (of April 28, 1941), however, effects sub.
stantI~1 changes in. ~he te~tamentary plan. Subsequent to
eXe?~tlOn of the orlgmal will of April 1, 1938, and the first
COdICIl of JUly 2~, 1939, Mr. Bristol had deeded to Agnes the
real. property whICh had been the subject of his testamentary
deVIse to her, and he had learned that his beloved grand.
daught~r, Rita Fox, was not deceased, as had been believed
a~ the time of execution of the earlier documents. (Rita had
dlsappe~red. and ;emained absent from her family without
commull1c~tmg WIth t~em for an extended period; she ret~rned prlOr to executlOn of the lost codicil.) The lost codiCIl revoked the provision of the original will devising to Agnes
the subsequently deeded property, revoked the nomination
of .Agnes to act as executrix without bond, nominated Edith
BrIstol You.ng as executrix in place of Agnes, and added the
na~e of RIta Fox (daughter of the testator's son Walter
BrI~t?l) to those of the granddaughters designated in the
c.od~CII of ~uly 28, 1939, to share in the remainder of the
lImIted de~Ise ~o. Walter. The original will also made testamentary dIspOSItion of certain parcels and items of property
to the several children and various grandchildren, and it
i

I

I
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tol's death, during his last illness, and after members of his
family had been called to his bedside, Agnes said "if she
could ever get her fingers on the will and the deeds she
would tear them all up except Walter's."
That Agnes had knowledge of the lost codicil, and of its
contents and potential effect, is established. Mr. Bristol himself, in the presence of his attorney, told her that he had
"changed" his will and that "Edith is going to be the executrix. ' , He said to her: "Why, Mrs. Bristol,' you would not
put a loan on this property? ... I have given you that and
that is all you are going to get out of my estate ... I' have
told you that I have changed my will, and that Edith is going to be the executrix, and that you are to have the property to provide for yourself the rest of your life ... If you
are going to make a loan on that property, I will not permit
Mr. Lake to dismiss this case." (Italics added.) While some
o! the testimon! of Agnes appears to have been positr~e . and emphatIc to the degree of the dramatic, that pertammg to her knowledge of the lost codicil apparently was
nei~her pos~tive nor conv~ncing to the trial judge. By way
OT. IllustratIOn the followmg questions and answers are informative:
"Q. And did you ever see either in my office or in the
possession of Mr. Bristol or about the home of yourself and
Mr. Bristol, a codicil to his will which had been prepared
by meY
"A. I don't think I have, Mr. Lake.
"Q. In other words, as far as you now recall you never
saw that document at any time?
"A. I do not think so." (Italics added.)
To an extent seldom seen in a record that before us in
this case discloses on the part of Agnes Bristol, as a witness
an apparent determination to evade direct and forthright
answers to pertinent questions. Repeatedly, through many
~ages of tra~s?ript, the trial judge is shown to have patIently a~d dIlIgently, and by necessity, admonished her to
answer dIrectly and responsively material questions properly
ad~ressed to her. The recitals as to money and property
WhICh Agnes procured from Mr. Bristol at the time of and
after her .marriage to him, and the method she employed on
on~ occasIon, leave no doubt as to the legal sufficiency of the
eVIdence to support a possible conclusion of the trial judge
that the procurement of money and property from Mr. Bris-
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tol was a motivating influence in Agnes' life and that she
would not necessarily permit compunctions of honesty to
deter her pursuit of the end sought.
The title to the income property which Mr. Bristol deeded
to Agnes was clear and apparently he was insistent that it
be kept clear of encumbrances. She also promised that she
would not sell the property. When questioned as to whether
she had falsified to Mr. Bristol concerning the procurement
of a loan on this property contrary to his admomtions, Agnes
at first denied that she had placed an encumbrance upon it.
She testified, "I did not, I sold it, I didn't put a loan, I sold
it." The following questions and answers then appear:
"THE COURT: The question is, did you tell your husband
that you were or were not putting a loan on it, what did you
tell your husband about a loan?
"A. I put a loan on first, and then I saw that I would lose
the property, I could not make expenses and I sold it.
"Q. By MR. LAKE: . . . My question is, at the time that
you came to my office for me to sign this dismissal, when I
told Mr. Bristol that you were trying to put a loan on the
property, isn't it a fact that you turned to him and said,
'I am not, I have no intention of putting a loan on this
property'?
"A. Well, I did not at that time, because there was already
a loan on it, Mr. Lake.
"Q. I am not questioning whether. o;t" not there :was a loan,
did you tell Mr. Bristol that you had no iD.tention of putting
a loan on this property Y
.
"A. Yes." . "
The object of the deceit disclosed. by the .abov.e~uoted
questions and answers becomes the morEl, apparent. upon, men.
tion of the fact that, as disclosed by!the.record; the ob~
ject of the call of Agnes and Luther BriStol at the office of
his attorney, when the quoted conversation took place, was to
secure a dismissal of the rescission suit which had been filed
by Mr. Bristol and which clouded the otherwise clear title of
Agnes to the property. Agnes' application for a loan on the
property was then pending and the title company had requested the dismissal of the suit with.its accompanying notice
of lis pendens. Mr. Bristol had no knowledge of the real
object of Agnes in seeking the dismissal, and in r~liance upon
her disavowal of intent to hypothecate the property, in-

,I
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structerl his attorney todisrniss the suit. The dismissal was
filed. The loan was effected.
Concerning the subsequent sale of the hypothecated property the testimony of Agnes is on the same plane. She at
first asserted that she had sold it for "about $4000" and
under the probing of cross-examination finally admitted receiving a price of $5,500 for it. Her testimony concerning
the regard and intentions of Mr. Bristol for his granddaughter Rita is also enlightening. It will be recalled that neither
in the original will nor in the first codicil was any provision
made for Rita, it being believed that she was no longer living. Only in the lost codicil, executed after her return, does
her name appear. The significant testimony is as follows:
"Q. Did you ever hear Mr. Bristol say anything about
Rita Fox, that he wanted her to be a beneficiary under
his estate?
"A. She is one of his granddaughters.
"Q. That' is not what I asked you, did you ever hear him
say that he wanted her to participate in the distribution of
his estate'
"A. Yes, sir.
"Q. And you also heard the conversation that he had with
his daughter, Edith, before his death, in which he told her,
and there was some discussion about him including Rita as
a beneficiary in his estate, wasn't there?
"A. Yes.
I I Q. And he mentioned the fact that he had included her
as one of the beneficiaries, didn't he Y
"A. Sure.
"' Q. And you knew that right up to the time of his death
that that was his thought and that was his desire, that Rit~
would benefit, isn't that right?
" A. Well, she is his great-granddaughter [sic]."
.The above-quoted testimony obviously depicts a state of
mmd of the testator which the trial judge could well have
~oncluded, was. consistent only with the lost codicil's being,
m Luther s behef, unrevoked and potentially operative. There
is other evidence in the record, cumulative or corroborative in
eff~ct, which like~ise tends to show the propensities of Agnes
BrIstol and the mterests of Luther Bristol, but enough has
been delineated to require us to hold that the determination
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of the trial court was based on. substantially. conflicting inferences and hence is conclusive.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., and Carter;

J.,

concur~ed.

TRAYNOR, J.-I dissent. There is, noeviden.ce in the
present case to support the finding that the codicil was in
existence at the time of the testator's death. No .one saw.the
codicil after its execution and delivery to the testator on
April 28, 1941. It did not appear amongst the, papers that
the testator kept in his safe-deposit box in. which was found
after his death, the will of April 1, 1938, a codicil of Juiy
'28, 1939, a so-called I I Second Codicil" not legally executed;
and deeds to his children. There is no explanation for its
disappearance between the time' of its execution and the
death of the testator. No claim is advanced that it was.
destroyed by public calamity, and any contention that the
appellant fraudulently destroyed it in the testatoris lifetime is
dispelled by the trial court's finding that it was in existence
at the time of his death.
The respondent relies upon evidence with regard first to
a conversation between herself and the testator concerning
Rita Fox, then to the delivery of testator's money belt to
respondent's husband, and finally to a conversation between
appellant and Mrs. Della Bristol, to prove the existence of
the codicil at the testator's death.
In the first codicil the testator's son Walter was given a
life estate in certain real property, with remainder to two
of Walter's daughters. A third daughter, Rita, who had
disappeared and not been heard from, was not given an interest in the remainder in vIew of the understanding, that
her two sisters would execute an agreement giving her an
equal interest should she return. Rita returned and the lost
codicil gave her an interest in the remainder equal to that
of each of her two sisters. Some time after the execution of
this codicil respondent had a conversation with the testator,
as to which respondent testified as follows: "Q. What did
he say? A. Well, he said, 'I must fix it so Rita can get hers,'
and I said, 'Why, dad, don't you remember, you had Mr.
Lake fix that up.' He said, "Oh, I had forgotten all about it.'
He was getting very forgetful, he could not seem to remember
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those things. Q. That was two months prior to his death Y
A. Yes, two or three months. Q. Could it have been as early
as February of this year 1 A. Well, it might have been, it
was February-I was over there February 20th, my son was
home on furlough and he and I went over to see his grandpa.
Q. Then when is the next time you went over Y A. I went
over about every two or three weeks. Q. Your recollection
is now that this conversation about Rita Fox took placeA. After February. Q. And about two months before September 30th f A. Well, it might have been longer, it is in
there between those dates. Q. By THE COURT: What was it
you said about the matter having been taken care of for Rita?
A. You see, she had disappeared and he had forgotten that
he had Mr. Lake fix up that codicil naming her, and he said,
'Did Charley ever have those girls sign a paper that would
give her her share?' He said, 'I want her to have her share. '
And I said, 'Why, Dad, you had that fixed up in Mr. Lake's
ofiice. ' Q. What did he say about it Y A. He just said that
he had forgotten about it, that he wanted to make sure that
Rita was going to get her part of it. Q. By MR. LAKE: And
when you mentioned the fact that he had taken care of it in
my office, what did he say1 A. Just that it had slipped his
memory, that he had forgotten all about it."
This evidence given its utmost weight would prove only
that the testator believed that the codicil was in existence
at the date of the conversation some two or three months
before his death. It in no way proves that the codicil was
in existence when the testator died, or even that at any time
after the conversation he did not revoke the codicil.
The testator at all times wore a belt containing a large
sum of money. Two or three days before his death, after
respondent had warned him of the danger of keeping the
money belt on, the testator delivered it to respondent's husband, Mr. Charles G. Young, for safekeeping. Mr. Young
placed the money in his safe-deposit box and properly accounted for it after the testator's death. There is nothing
in this evidence that has any bearing upon the existence of
the lost codicil at the time of the testator's death. It is
apparently the view of l'espondent that since the testator
named her as executrix in the lost codicil, he confirmed that
choice when he turned over his money belt to her husband,
Mr. Charles G. Young, for safekeeping. There is nothing in
the record, however, to indicate that the testator was think-
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ing in terms of the administration of his estate or that he
turned his money belt over to Mr. Young, who was not only
decedent's son-in-law but an attorney, rather than to any
one else for any other reason than that he could ~rust Mr.
Young with its safekeeping during his illness. . .
.
According to the testimony of Mrs. Della Brls~ol, the Wlfe
of one of the testator's sons, the appellant made the statem~~t
to hEn' eight days before the death of the ~estator that . if
she could get her fingers on the will andth~ deedss~e would
tear them all up except Walter's." There is nOFhmg here
to suggest that the will was in existence at the tIme of the
testator's death. Nor would this evidence by itself support
a finding that appellant destroyed the c?dicil, and th~re is
no indication in the findings that she dId so. There IS no
evidence that she ever saw the codicil or had any opportunity to destroy it. The bank records show that no one but
the testator ever had access to the testator's safe-deposit box
in which he kept his valuable papers, and in which the will,
the first codicil codicil number two, and the deeds were found
after his death. Appellant's character, however it is evaluated and her motives however suspicious they may appear,
can~ot stand as proof of the fraudulent destruction of the
will when there are no facts or circumstances that make such
a destruction plausible. Her own testimony did nothing to
establish such a destruction, and it is therefore immaterial
whether or not the trial court believed her, for a fact is
proved by affirmative evidence, not by disbelief of a witness.
(Moulton v. Moulton, 178 Minn. 568 [227 N.W. 896] ; Hyslop
v. Boston & Me. Ry., 208 Mass. 362 [94 N.E. 310; 21 Ann.
Cas. 1121] ; Boice-Perrine Co. v. Kelley, 243 Mass. 327 [137
N.E. 731] ; see 23 C.J. 51; 32 C.J.S. 1134.)
A finding of fact cannot be sustained if no evidence appears in the record from which the trier of facts could ~ea
sonably infer that it is more probable that the fact eXISts
than that it does not. The suggestion in the. majorityopinion that evidence may be overwhelming in its persuasiveness
even though it "may appear relatively unSubstantial-if .it
can be reflected at all-in a phonographic record" is. in effect
a suggestion that an appellate court may disregard the manifest unpersuasiveness of the evidence it is charged to review..
If an appellate court could attribute reality to the phantom
of a persuasiveness that does not survive in the record, it
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would no longer be bound by the record itself and could even
affirm a jUdgment that was not sustained by any proof.
The relation, between the presumption of revocation, invoked in the majority opinion, to Probate Code section 350
requires clarification. Section 350 of the Probate Code provides: "No will shall be proven as a lost or destroyed will
unless proved to have been in existence at the time of the
death of the testator, or shown to have been destroyed ftaudlently or by public calamity in the lifetime of the testator,
without his knowledge." Some confusion has attended the
application of this section since the majority opinion in Estate of Sweetman, 185 Cal. 27 [195 P. 918], first invoked the
presumption that a will has been revoked when it is known
to have been in the possession of the decedent but cannot be
found after his death. Apparently the presumption was regarded as arising independently of section 1339 of the Code
of Civil Procedure, the antecedent of Probate Code section
350, for the will was admitted to probate not simply because
the declarations of the testatrix showed that she had not revoked it and thus had the effect of overcoming the presumption (185 Cal. 27, 33), but also because under section 1963,
subdivision 32 of the Code of Civil Procedure, a thing once
shown to be in existence is presumed to continue in existence
so long as things of that nature usually exist. (185 Cal. 27,
34.) It would not have been necessary to invoke the presumption of continued existence if in the opinion of the
majority, the requirements of section 1339 had been satisfied
by proof of nonrevocation. In a vigorous dissent, Justice
Olney' took the view that proof of nonrevocation was immaterial, since existence of the will at the time of the testator's
death had to be established, and that the very purpose of
section 1339 was "to make it impossible to probate an unproduced will by proof that it was in existence prior to the
testator's death eked out by any presumption that it continued to exist until he died."
Subsequently in Estate of Ross, 199 Cal. 641, 647, 648
[250 P. 676], the court overruled the holding in Estate of
Sweetman that a will once in existence is presumed to continue in existence, declaring: "If the rule were otherwise
all that would be necessary in order to prove a lost or destroyed will would be to show that the will was in the possession of the testatrix some time, any time, prior to her
death with no apparent intervening cause for destruction
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or revocation, and thus rebut the presumption of revocation
and entirely nullify the requirements of said section 1339."
Without the presumption of continued existence the order
admitting the will to probate could not have been affirmed
in the Sweetman case, for. there was nothing else to prove
the existence of the will at the time of the death of the testatrix. Nothing in that case, therefore, affords any 'support'
for the proposition that proof of nonrevocation alone is'suffi.J
cient to comply with Probate Code section 350. '. '.
'
While the overruling of Estate of" Sweetman did much' to
dispel the confusion engendered by that case, the relation of
Probate Code section 350 to the presumption of revocation
that is said to arise in these cases still requires ,clarification.
If section 350 provided simply that a presumption of revocation arises in the case of a lost will, it would be ,necessary
only to rebut the presumption to prove that the will was in
existence at the time of the testator's death. A. presumption
of revocation independent of section 350 becomes superfluous,
however, if the very existence of the will at the time of the.
testator's death must be proved. While proof of that eXIStence establishes the fact of nonrevocation, th.e converse does
not follow that a will exists because there is no revocation
thereof. It would therefore be idle to rebut the presumption
of revocation if there were no proof that a will existed at the
time of the testator's death.
Section 350 cannot reasonably be construed as creating a
presumption of revocation. It is concerned; not with the rules
governing revocation, which are specifically set forth in sec..:
tion 74 of the Probate Code, but with the procedure for establishing a lost or destroyed will. (Estate of Patterson, 155
Cal. 626, 633-638 [102 P. 941, 132 Am.St.Rep. 116, 18 Ann.
Cas. 625,26 L.R.A.N.S. 654].) Compliance with the substantive provisions that determine the status of the will as
an executed instrument is not enough to render the will operative as a conveyance. A will cannot be given in evidence
as the foundation of a right or title unless it has been duly
probated (Estate of Patterson, 155 Cal. 626, 636 [102 P:
941, 132 Am.St.Rep. 116, 18 Ann. Cas. 625, 26 L.R.A.N.S.
654]), and section 350 prescribes the requirements that must
be satisfied before a lost will can be probated. It is' therefore not controlling that under the substantive provisions of
the law, the will has been duly executed arid has not been
revoked, for it cannot be probated if the requirements pre-
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scribed in the code for the probate of wills cannot be met.
The requirement of proof that the will existed at the time of
the testator's death cannot be translated into a requirement
of proof of nonrevocation. Such a translation would render
meaningless the provision regarding wills destroyed fraudulently or by public calamity, for under Probate Code section 74 there can be no revocation under such circumstances.
Indeed, the amendment with respect to wills destroyed by
public calamity was held applicable in Estate of Patterson,
155 Cal. 626 [102 P. 941, 132 Am.St.Rep. 116, 18 Ann.Cas.
625, 26 L.R.A.N.S. 654], to a will destroyed before the adoption of the amendment, on the ground that the will had not
been revoked. Had the destruction amounted to a revocation
of the will, the estate would have vested in the heirs and the
subsequent amendment could not have served to take the
estate from them. Since the probate procedure related simply
to the remedy and not to the foundation of the rights of
those claiming under the will, the amendment was held applicable. The will was admitted to probate, not simply because it was unrevoked, but because by virtue of the amendment a will destroyed by public calamity without the knowledge of the testator could be probated even though it was
admittedly not in existence at the time of the death of the
testator.
In section 350 of the Probate Code, the Legislature has
exercised the greatest caution not to leave the way open for
the establishment of spurious wills or the probate of wills
that testators have intentionally destroyed without leaving
adequate proof of such destruction, even going so far as to
preclude probate of a will that is lost or destroyed, other
than by fraud or public calamity, before the death of the
testator. (Estate of Johnson, 134 Cal. 662 [66 P. 847];
Estate of Patterson, supra; Estate of Kidder, 57 Cal. 282.)
It has placed upon the testator the responsibility for the
safekeeping of his will until his death. At the same time it
has recognized that once the testator dies there is greater
risk of loss or destruction of his will, and it has therefore
sought to insure that his wishes would nonetheless be carried
out, by providing that his will need not be in existence at the
time of probate so long as there is proof of its existence at
the time of death and proof by two witnesses of its provisions.
It is for the Legislature to choose or modify the course it
deems proper in this regard, not for the court to undertake
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modifications merely because in its view the Legislature has
acted in excess of caution.
The judgment should be reversed.
Curtis, J., and Edmonds, J., concurred.
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied December 27, 1943. Curtis, J., Edmonds, J., and Traynor, J., voted
for a rehearing.
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MARGARET KRUZIE et aI., Appellants, v. MABEL SANDERS et aI., Respondents.

[1] Automobiles-Actions-Province of Court and Jury-Negligence of Operator-Excessive Speed.-In an action for injuries sustained by an occupant of an automobile when it
skidded off a wet road, the slippery condition of which was
partly caused by the sap of adjacent eucalyptus trees, where
there was testimony that, shortly before the accident, the car
was traveling between 55 and 60 miles an hour and that
plaintiff had cautioned defendant against driving so fast, and
where a traffic officer testified that any person who would
drive on that road over 30 miles an hour would be endangering the lives of those in the car, the evidence of negligence
was sufficient to take the case to the jury, and a judgment
of dismissal could not be sustained on the ground of failure
to prove lack of due care.
[2] Id. - Actions - Guest Law-Status of Injured Occupant.In an action for injuries sustained by an occupant of an
automobile who claims that defendant driver was guilty only
of ordinary negligence, plaintiff must establish that she did
not accept the ride as a guest without giving compensation
therefor, within the meaning of Veh. Code, § 403.

[3] Id.-Conduct of Operator-Care as to Guests-Who are
[3] Who is a guest or entitled to benefit of "guest" 'statute,
notes, 82 A.L.R. 1365; 95 A.L.R. 1180; 109 A.L.R. 667. See, also,
2 Ca1.Jur. Ten-Year Supp. 541; 5 Am.Jur. 632.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Automobiles, § 275; [2] Automobiles,
§ 194; [3-8, 11] Automobiles, § 123(2); [9, 10] Automobiles,
§ 123(1).

